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The literature finds mixed empirical evidence for systematic relations between founding-
family ownership and cost of debt. Using a sample of 3380 privately (non-state) controlled 
but publicly listed firms in China between 2004 and 2010, we find that, on average, founding-
family controlled firms pay significantly lower cost of debt, relative to non-founding-family 
controlled firms. Further investigation reveals that the negative relation between founding-
family control and cost of debt exists mainly in firms that are relatively less opaque. Our 
results are robust to different measures of cost of debt and information opacity. We further 
generate evidence that in regions with more developed institutions, information opacity has a 
less significant impact on the relation between founding-family control and cost of debt. Our 
study highlights the importance of information opacity in understanding the impact of 
founding-family control on cost of debt, at least in countries with relatively underdeveloped 
institutions. 
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The impact of information opacity on the relation between founding-




 A relatively small proportion of the literature on family firms1 examines the impacts 
of family control on the agency problem between shareholders and debt-holders, and on the 
agency cost of debt (Anderson et al., 2003; Ellul et al., 2007; Aslan and Kumar, 2009; Lin et 
al., 2011; D’Aurizio et al., 2012). Using a sample of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 1998, 
Anderson et al. (2003) find that founding-family ownership is associated with significantly 
lower cost of debt financing. These authors argue that founding families’ undiversified 
portfolios, strong interests in long-term firm survival, and reputational concerns give them 
great incentives to reduce the agency conflicts between shareholders and debt-holders. 
Although the rationale in Anderson et al. (2003) is intuitively sound, caution is needed in 
interpreting the negative relation between founding-family ownership and cost of debt. 
                                                 
1 Researchers seem to have used the term “family firms” rather loosely in their various definitions of the term. 
For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Wang (2006) use “founding family firms” and “family firms” 
interchangeably; Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and many others 
use the more general term “family firms;” while Anderson et al. (2009) explicitly use “founder firms” and “heir 
firms.” Due to the nature of our sample (see detailed description in the data section), we follow Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) and use “founding-family controlled firms” or simply “founding-family firms” in this study. When 





 Using a sample of S&P 500 firms between 1994 and 2002, Wang (2006) investigates 
the relation between founding-family ownership and the quality of accounting information. 
This author finds that founding-family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality, 
in other words, greater information transparency. 
 A closer look at these two studies shows that both Anderson et al. (2003) and Wang 
(2006) study S&P 500 firms in the U.S., thereby largely excluding the influence of 
institutions known to affect corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 
2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) and cost of debt (Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Qi et al., 
2010). The sample periods in these two studies largely overlap.2 Finally, Wang (2006) 
follows Anderson and Reeb (2003) in defining and measuring founding-family ownership; 
the same definition is used in Anderson et al. (2003). 
 It is well documented that greater information transparency is generally associated 
with lower cost of debt (Ziebart and Reiter, 1992; Sengupta, 1998; Duffie and Lando, 2001; 
Yu, 2005; Livingston and Zhou, 2010). The following questions are then raised. Is the 
negative relation between founding-family ownership and cost of debt discovered by 
Anderson et al. (2003) a direct result of the nature of family ownership per se? Or does it 
simply capture the consequences of the deviation of information transparency between 
founding-family firms and non-family firms, as described in Wang (2006)? 
 These questions motivate our research. In this study, we investigate the impact of 
founding-family control on agency cost of debt and the role of information opacity in 
understanding the relation between founding-family control and agency cost of debt. Extant 
                                                 
2 In a related paper, Ali et al. (2007) study a sample of S&P 500 firms between 1998 and 2002 and find that 
family firms make better financial disclosure. As a result, family firms are more transparent as indicated by 
larger analyst following, more informative analysts’ forecasts, and smaller bid-ask spreads. Although these 
authors’ definition of family firms is subject to criticism (Hutton, 2007), they nonetheless provide additional 
evidence on the positive relation between family firms and information transparency.  
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evidence shows that institutions have significant influence on agency conflicts (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Some recent studies also find 
direct links between institutions and cost of debt (Miller and Puthenpurackal, 2002; Boubakri 
and Ghouma, 2010; Qi et al., 2010). Following these studies, we also examine the impact of 
institutions on cost of debt and on the role of information opacity. Specifically, we aim to 
answer the following four main questions: (1) Do founding-family controlled firms exhibit 
lower or higher cost of debt relative to non-founding-family controlled firms? (2) Is 
founding-family control positively or negatively associated with corporate information 
opacity? (3) Does information opacity affect the relation between founding-family control 
and cost of debt? (4) Do institutions influence the impact of information opacity on the 
relation between founding-family control and cost of debt? 
 Using a sample of 3380 privately controlled but publicly listed firms in China 
between 2004 and 2010, we find that, on average, founding-family controlled firms have 
substantially lower costs of debt relative to non-founding-family controlled firms, consistent 
with Anderson et al. (2003). However, further investigation shows that the negative relation 
between founding-family control and cost of debt exists mainly in firms that are relatively 
transparent. Such a negative relation weakens substantially in those firms that are relatively 
opaque. This is not surprising, as controlling shareholders have incentives to reduce 
information transparency when they attempt to extract private benefits (Leuz et al., 2003; 
Lang et al., 2004). In other words, in opaque firms, the benefits of founding-family control 
are likely to be significantly reduced by their entrenchment incentives. This finding indicates 
that the negative relation between founding-family control and cost of debt is at least partly 
attributable to the relatively more transparent information in founding-family firms. 
 We also find evidence that information opacity has a positive impact on cost of debt 
in both founding-family controlled firms and non-founding-family controlled firms, and that 
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such positive impact is significantly stronger in founding-family controlled firms than in non-
founding-family controlled firms. Finally, we generate evidence that institutional factors, 
such as the overall degree of marketization and legal protection of property rights can 
mitigate the adverse impact of information opacity on cost of debt in founding-family 
controlled firms. 
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, most previous studies 
use either U.S. or cross-country data. Our study is one of very few studies that focus on a 
single country outside the U.S. Our results show that in China—a country well-known for 
weak institutions—founding-family firms, on average, exhibit lower agency cost of debt than 
non-founding-family firms. Our results are contrary to Ellul et al. (2007), who find that, 
relative to non-family firms, family firms in countries with high investor protection benefit 
from lower debt costs, while family firms in countries with low investor protection suffer 
from higher debt costs. To our best knowledge, the only other similar study is D’Aurizio et 
al. (2012), who find evidence that in Italy (also a country known for weak institutions 
(Volpin, 2002)) family blockholders can attenuate agency conflicts between shareholders and 
creditors. Thus, our study raises an interesting question. Is China (probably alongside Italy) 
the only major economy where institutions are weak and yet family firms, on average, are 
still better at mitigating the shareholder-creditor agency problem than non-family firms? 
 Second, although a few recent studies begin to examine the relation between 
founding-family ownership and cost of debt in the framework of institutions (especially the 
role of investor protections) (Ellul et al., 2007; Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010), little work, if 
any, examines the potential role of information opacity in understanding such relation, 
despite the importance of information in closely related areas. For example, Fama (1980), 
Fama and Jensen (1983), and several other researchers stress the role of information in 
understanding the agency theory (see Eisenhardt (1989) for a review). Sengupta (1998), 
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Duffie and Lando (2001), and Yu (2005) all find a strong and positive link between 
information opacity and cost of debt. We integrate these two lines of research and provide 
strong evidence that information opacity does matter with respect to the relation between 
founding-family ownership and cost of debt. 
 Third, our study contributes to the literature on firm–bank relationships. A number of 
studies examine the relationship between firms and their creditors (banks in particular) and 
the impacts of this relationship. On one hand, Both Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Franks and 
Mayer (1997) find that a close tie between a firm and its banks can facilitate the firm’s access 
to bank financing. On the other hand, Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2006) and Luo et al. 
(2011) argue that controlling shareholders and managers may collude with banks to 
expropriate minority shareholders. In a recent study, Ma et al. (2012) find that founding-
family firms are less likely to expropriate minority shareholders compared with non–
founding-family firms. Our results therefore show that when founding families are the 
controlling shareholders, they are more likely to build an intimate and well-informed 
relationship with banks and reduce the agency cost of bank loans, without this coming at the 
expense of minority shareholders. 
 Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on the relation between ownership 
structure and information opacity. There is a large and growing body of literature that 
examines how the level and quality of accounting and financial disclosure are affected by 
firm ownership structure (Chau and Gray, 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Francis et al., 2005a; 
Attig et al., 2006; Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007). Wang (2006) compares his finding with that 
of Fan and Wong (2002), who find that concentrated ownership is associated with low 
earnings informativeness in East Asian economies. Wang acknowledges that the negative 
relation between family ownership and high earnings quality in his study may not hold in 
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countries with weak legal and market institutions. We provide new evidence that such 
negative relation can exist in a weak-institution country such as China. 
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 reports our main 
empirical results. Section 5 carries out robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 sets forth our 
conclusions. 
2. Theoretical framework, literature review, and hypotheses 
2.1. Founding-family control and agency cost of debt 
 Founding families are a unique type of blockholders. The benefits and costs of 
founding-family control have been examined by a large body of literature. Researchers 
generally have debated two opposite effects of founding-family control, each with theoretical 
and empirical support. 
2.1.1. The entrenchment effect 
 Founding families often have highly concentrated ownership in their firms. They also 
enhance their control through complex ownership structures, such as pyramids, dual-class 
shares, voting agreements, cross-holdings, and disproportionate board control (Zingales, 
1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In addition, founders may gain additional power and influence 
from their founder status (Adams et al., 2005). Further, founding-family-controlled firms 
often limit management positions to family members and associates, even when they lack the 
necessary expertise and management skills. This negatively affects firm performance (Morck 
et al., 2000; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Indeed, it is argued that entrenched family managers 
who resist being replaced even when they are no longer competent may be the costliest 
agency problem of all (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
9 
 
 Due to their unique and dominant positions, founding families as blockholders have 
strong incentives and capabilities to extract private benefits, thus increasing risk of 
bankruptcy. Anticipating such risks, debt-holders will demand higher returns as 
compensation, resulting in higher cost of debt for founding-family controlled firms, relative 
to non–founding-family controlled firms. 
2.1.2. The alignment effect 
 On the other hand, highly concentrated ownership by founding families can serve as a 
credible commitment not to expropriate investors (Gomes, 2000). Anderson et al. (2003) 
argue that, compared with non-founding-family blockholders, founding families have 
stronger interests in the long-term survival of their firms, with a desire to pass them onto 
future generations. Fahlenbrach (2009) also argues that founders often consider their firms to 
be personal achievements, and this motivates them to take a long-term approach. Further, 
Burkart et al. (2003) point out that a family name connected to a successful family business 
may bring non-pecuniary or reputational benefits, such as a high social status and political 
connections. 
 All these arguments suggest that founding families have strong incentives not to 
behave in a way that could damage their relationship with investors, including debt-holders. 
Finally, the ongoing involvement of the same founding family makes it easier for the firm 
and its creditors to build an intimate and well-informed relationship, which further reduces 
the agency problem between shareholders and debt-holders (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Franks and Mayer, 1997; Anderson et al., 2003). 
2.1.3. Empirical evidence 
 The above analyses suggest that whether the entrenchment effect or the alignment 
effect dominates (and consequently the nature of the relation between founding-family 
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control and agency cost of debt) is largely an empirical issue. Empirical evidence on this 
issue is, however, still limited. 
 Anderson et al. (2003) are the first to directly examine the impact of family ownership 
on agency cost of debt. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, these authors find that founding-
family firms pay lower cost of debt financing (32 basis points) than non-family firms. They 
suggest that bondholders view family ownership as an organizational structure that better 
protects their interests. In a recent paper, D’Aurizio et al. (2012) take advantage of a natural 
experiment, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. These authors find that following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, family firms in Italy experienced a smaller 
contraction in granted bank credit than non-family firms, indicating that family blockholders 
can attenuate agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors. 
Aslan and Kumar (2009), Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), and Lin et al. (2011) use 
samples from Western European and East Asian countries (covering 22, 19, and 22 countries, 
respectively) and find evidence that bond yield spreads are positively related to family 
control rights and the interaction between family control rights and the control-ownership 
wedge. These authors conclude that family control is perceived to be of high risk of 
expropriation by bondholders. 
 Finally, Ellul et al. (2007) argue that the impact of family blockholders on agency cost 
of debt can go either way, depending on the creditor’s protection environment in the country 
where the firm is located. Confirming their prediction, these authors find that family firms in 
countries with strong investor protection benefit from lower debt cost relative to non-family 
firms, while in countries with weak investor protection family firms suffer from higher debt 
cost. 
 China has had a long tradition of cultural emphasis on inter-personal relationships and 
reputation. The lack of well-developed formal institutions in protecting property rights makes 
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informal institutions based on reputation and relationships even more crucial in order for 
entrepreneurs to secure external financing (Allen et al., 2005). As a result, founding families 
in China may have greater concerns about their reputation than their counterparts in 
developed economies. Although we are not aware of direct evidence, it is reasonable to 
assume that founding families in China are less diversified than those in more developed 
economies, because the underdeveloped financial markets in China limit diversification 
opportunities. Thus, the success of listed firms that founding families control becomes even 
more important to them. Overall, founding families in China are strongly motivated by the 
long-term success of their firms. Consequently the alignment effect is likely to dominate the 
entrenchment effect. Indeed, Ma et al. (2012) find that founding-family firms are less likely 
to expropriate assets than non-founding-family firms. Thus, debt-holders regard firms 
controlled by founding families to be less risky than those controlled by non-founding-family 
blockholders. Consequently, debt-holders demand lower cost of debt. These arguments lead 
to our first hypothesis: 
H1: On average, founding-family controlled firms have lower cost of debt than non-
founding-family controlled firms. 
 
2.2. Founding-family control and information opacity 
 Stiglitz (2000) points out that information transparency is essential for investors to 
effectively discriminate among borrowers. A large number of studies provide both theoretical 
and empirical evidence that information transparency is an important determinant of the cost 
of debt (Ziebart and Reiter, 1992; Sengupta, 1998; Duffie and Lando, 2001; Francis et al., 
2005b; Yu, 2005; Livingston and Zhou, 2010). Therefore, in this section, we briefly review 
the literature on the relation between family ownership and firm information opacity. 
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2.2.1. Entrenchment effect and information opacity 
 When entrenched insiders attempt to expropriate firm assets, they have incentives to 
withhold or manipulate accounting earnings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Leuz et al. (2003) 
argue that, to conceal their private benefits of control, insiders have incentives to manipulate 
earnings (thus increasing information opacity) to lower the likelihood of outside intervention. 
Following this argument, Lang et al. (2004) find that analysts are less willing to follow firms 
with potential to manipulate information, such as family-controlled firms. Consistent with the 
entrenchment argument, Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that while board independence is 
positively associated with the comprehensiveness of financial disclosure in Hong Kong, this 
association is weaker for family controlled firms. Chau and Gray (2002) find that in Hong 
Kong and Singapore the level of voluntary information disclosure is lower in family firms. 
Fan and Wong (2002) also find that across seven East Asian countries, concentrated 
ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness, as entrenched controlling 
shareholders limit the flow of accounting information to outside investors. 
 The above mentioned analyses and evidence thus suggest that entrenched founding-
family blockholders increase the opacity of firm financial disclosures. 
2.2.2. Alignment effect and information opacity 
  According to the alignment effect, founding-family blockholders have greater 
incentives toward the long-term success of the firm and have greater concerns about 
reputation than non-founding-family blockholders. As a result, founding families are more 
willing to provide transparent financial information in exchange for better contracting terms 
from investors, such as lower cost of debt. In addition, founding-family controlling 
shareholders have better knowledge about the firm’s business activities (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). As a result, not only can they quickly detect managers’ manipulation of accounting 
information, they can also rely less on accounting-based performance measures in designing 
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management compensation (Chen, 2005). This in turn reduces incentives for managers to 
engage in earnings management. 
 Thus, the alignment effect suggests that founding-family controlled firms are more 
transparent than non-founding-family controlled firms. Consistent with this argument, both 
Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) find evidence that for large U.S. firms, family firms make 
higher quality financial disclosures than non-family firms. Following our earlier analysis that 
the alignment effect is likely to dominate the entrenchment effect for founding-family 
controlled firms in China, we hypothesize that: 
H2: On average, founding-family controlled firms are less opaque than non-founding-family 
controlled firms in terms of corporate information. 
 
2.3. Information opacity and the relation between founding-family control and cost of debt 
 We earlier argue that, on average, founding-family controlled firms are less opaque 
and have lower cost of debt than non-founding-family controlled firms, because of the 
dominance of the alignment effect. However, the degree of opacity can still vary from firm to 
firm, even for founding-family controlled firms. 
 Accounting and financial information is used to mitigate the agency problem between 
shareholders, managers, and creditors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bushman and Smith, 2001). 
Transparent information represents founding-family blockholders’ long-term commitment to 
the firm, and thus their greater willingness to align their interests with those of other investors 
(including debt-holders). Thus, it is not difficult to argue that in opaque firms, founding-
family blockholders’ commitment is not as strong as in transparent firms, and that founding 
families have less incentive to mitigating agency conflicts with debt-holders. It is possible 
that in opaque founding-family firms, the entrenchment effect could overshadow the 
alignment effect (Leuz et al., 2003). As a result, the negative impact of founding-family 
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control on cost of debt is expected to be weaker when information is opaque. Formally, we 
summarize our hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The negative relation between founding-family control and cost of debt is stronger when 
information is transparent; this relation is weaker when information is opaque. 
2.4. Institutional development and the impact of information opacity on the relation between 
founding-family control and cost of debt 
 Evidence from the literature shows that institutional development is important in 
mitigating agency conflicts and in curbing private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Recent studies also show that 
institutions (legal protection of investors in particular) are negatively associated with agency 
cost of debt (Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Qi et al., 2010). Earlier analysis indicates that 
when information is opaque, founding-family blockholders could become entrenched, and the 
negative relation between founding-family control and cost of debt would be substantially 
weaker. In this paper, we take advantage of the huge variations among China’s diverse 
regions, in terms of economic and legal development, to test whether institutions have 
significant effects in mitigating the adverse impact of information opacity on the relation 
between founding-family control and cost of debt. 
 Cheung et al. (2010) find that severity of expropriation by controlling shareholders in 
state-owned public firms is negatively related to the likelihood of government bureaucrats 
being prosecuted for misappropriation of state funds. Both Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004) 
and Li (2010) find that savings and investments are positively correlated at the provincial 
level, a strong indication that capital mobility is low in China. These findings imply that the 
level of legal and economic development in the province in which a firm is located could 
have an important influence on agency conflicts between shareholders and debt-holders, and 
consequently, agency cost of debt. We earlier argue that information opacity can weaken the 
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negative relation between founding-family control and the cost of debt, as founding families 
may become entrenched when information is opaque. However, in regions with more 
developed legal and economic institutions, founding families are less likely to take advantage 
of information opacity to expropriate other investors, including debt-holders. This implies 
that in regions with more developed institutions, the potential entrenchment effect of 
founding-family control is less likely to undermine the alignment effect, even when 
information is opaque. Therefore, our final hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: In regions with more developed institutions, information opacity has a less significant 
impact in weakening the negative relation between founding-family control and cost of debt. 
 
3. Data and statistics 
3.1. Sample and data source 
 Our initial sample consists of all privately controlled non-financial A-share issuing 
firms listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 
2004 and 2010. We exclude from our sample firms in which the largest ultimate shareholder 
is a foreign entity and firms that are cross-listed overseas, as foreign accounting rules may 
affect the treatment of some accounting items used in this study. We then delete observations 
for the first year of public listing, as an IPO may affect at least three of the four measures of 
information opacity used in this study, i.e., analyst coverage, trading volume, and analyst 
forecast error (Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Cliff and Denis, 2004; Ellis, 2006). After deleting 
observations with missing data, our final sample consists of 708 firms and 3380 firm-year 
observations. 
 We obtain our accounting and financial data from the China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by Shenzhen GTA Information 
Technology Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely used databases for research on 
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the Chinese stock market. Data to construct our four information opacity measures is also 
from CSMAR. We manually collect information on firm founders and manager political 
connections from annual reports, the Internet, and media reports. 
3.2. Measurement of variables 
3.2.1. Cost of debt 
 Most studies measure the cost of debt as the spread between corporate bond yield and 
a benchmark (e.g., U.S. treasury yield or LIBOR). The corporate bond market, however, is 
underdeveloped in China and many other emerging economies. Chinese firms were allowed 
to issue corporate bonds only from 1998. In 2010, total bond issuance in China was 9292 
billion Chinese Yuan, of which only 1698 billion (or just 18.27%) was by companies, with 
the remainder issued by governments.3 As of the end of 2010, the market capitalization of 
China’s corporate bonds was only 6.9% of GDP; at the same time, stock market capitalization 
was 66.16% of GDP and bank loans stood at 119.44% of GDP (Ma and Rath, 2012). For our 
sample firms, bank loans represent over 40% of total liabilities, while bonds account for only 
1.6% of total liabilities. Thus, this paper focuses on bank loans. 
 We conduct our main analyses using two measures of the cost of bank loans. Our first 
measure (Rate 1) follows Luo et al. (2011) and is defined as interest expense divided by the 
sum of short-term loans, loans due within one year, and long-term liabilities. Our second 
measure (Rate 2) follows Zou and Adams (2008) and is defined as the sum of interest 
expense and capitalized interest divided by total liabilities. We use two alternative measures 
of bank loan cost in our robustness tests in Section 5. 
                                                 
3 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/05/china-bonds-issuance-idUSL3E8C542820120105, last accessed on 
September 24, 2012. 
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3.2.2. Key independent variables 
Founding-family firms 
 Despite the extant literature on family firms, there is no universally accepted 
definition of what is a family firm.4 Because of concentrated ownership in many European 
and East Asian countries, researchers commonly apply a minimum threshold for the largest 
shareholders’ ownership to ensure effective control (Fan and Wong, 2002; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). 
 In this study, we use a dummy variable to denote a founding-family firm if: (1) the 
founder and founder family members hold at least 10% of the firm’s cash flow rights; and (2) 
the founding-family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.5 We 
note that some studies further distinguish among family firms those with founder-CEOs, 
descendant-CEOs, and hired CEOs. We aim to examine the impact of founding families from 
a more general perspective and thus do not make such a distinction. 
Information opacity 
 We use four different measures of information opacity: auditor identity, financial 
analyst coverage, trading volume, and analyst forecast error. 
                                                 
4 See Miller et al. (2007) for a comprehensive review of a wide variety of family firm definitions.  
5 Among our 3380 sample firms, 1094 meet our definition of founding-family firms. If we relax the definition 
by removing the 10% threshold for cash flow rights, the number of founding-family firms increases to 1212. We 
run all regressions using this alternative definition. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. If we 
remove the second criterion, the number of founding-family firms remains the same. In other words, when the 
founding family holds at least 10% of cash flow rights, no other blockholders hold more than 10% of equity 





 External auditors provide an independent assessment of the accuracy and fairness of a 
firm’s accounting and financial information, and consequently reduce information asymmetry 
between shareholders and debt-holders. Chen et al. (2011) find that in China larger auditors 
are significantly more likely to issue modified audit opinions than smaller auditors, consistent 
with the view that larger auditors in China are more independent and have stronger incentives 
to protect their reputations. Numerous studies find a positive association between quality of 
the external auditor and transparency of the audited firm’s financial information.6 
 Thus, we use a dummy variable to denote greater information transparency if the firm 
hires one of the international Big 4 auditors, or the six largest national auditors by revenue7 to 
audit its financial reports.8 
Financial analyst coverage 
The greater the number of financial analysts following a firm, the more intensive the 
firm’s financial information is under market scrutiny. We measure analyst coverage as the 
natural logarithm of the number of financial analysts following the firm. That is: 
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 = lg (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
Trading volume 
 Investors are more willing to buy or to sell a company’s shares when there is less 
information asymmetry. Thus, trading volume is an inverse proxy for information opacity 
                                                 
6 See Armstrong et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the role of external auditors in 
improving financial information transparency and in reducing agency conflicts.  
7 The international Big 4 are KPMG, PwC, E&Y, and Deloitte. The national top 6 are Lixin, Zhongrui Yuehua, 
Xinyong Zhonghe, Tianjian, Daxin, and Dahua. 
8 Inevitably, it is a subjective judgment as to how many auditors are deemed to be large auditors. As a 
robustness check, we alternatively classify the largest 8 (Chen et al., 2011) or the largest 15 auditors as large 
auditors. Our main findings are robust to these alternative classifications. 
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(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). We measure trading volume as the average daily number of 
shares traded, scaled by the average total number of shares outstanding.9 
 
Analyst forecast error 
Analysts’ forecast error is regarded as a proxy for availability of the firm’s 
information. Therefore, larger analysts’ forecast error indicates information that is more 
opaque. Following Easterwood and Nutt (1999), we measure forecast error as follows:10 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =




Except for auditor identity, which is a dummy variable, a higher value for Analyst or 
Volume or a lower value for Forecast error indicates information being more transparent. To 
ease interpretation of results, we multiply Analyst and Volume by a negative constant 
(negative 1). 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 To control for other factors that could affect the cost of bank loans, we include the 
following control variables in our regressions: the size of the firm (Firm size), leverage 
(Leverage), net value of property, plant and equipment (PPE), cash flow performance 
(Performance), capital expenditure (CAPEX), ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
(Current ratio), sales growth (Sales), tunneling by controlling shareholders (Tunneling), total 
number of directors on the board (Board size), percentage of independent directors 
(Independence), political connectedness of CEO (Political), and official lending rate 
                                                 
9 It is clear that the results will be the same if we measure the trading volume as daily average value of shares 
traded scaled by average market capitalization.  
10 We calculate forecast error using the absolute difference between mean analysts’ forecast EPS and actual EPS 
in the numerator, as we are interested only in the magnitude of the forecast error, not the direction of the error.  
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specified by the regulator (Official rate). Theoretical and empirical evidence on the impacts 
of these variables on cost of bank loans is relatively well-known. We therefore provide only a 
brief discussion. 
 Larger firms are perceived to be less risky as they have more assets in place and are 
more visible, relative to smaller firms. Therefore, larger firms are expected to be associated 
with lower cost of bank loans. Firms with higher leverage have higher default risk and thus 
are required to pay higher cost for bank loans. PPE is expected to be negatively associated 
with cost of bank loans, since higher PPE indicates more collateral in case of loan default. 
Both cash flow performance and current ratio are expected to be negatively associated with 
cost of bank loans, since higher cash flows and higher current ratio enable the firm to better 
service its loans and reduce default risk. We also expect negative impacts from both sales 
growth and capital expenditure on cost of bank loans, as higher sales growth and capital 
expenditure indicate greater future growth potential. Following Jiang et al. (2010), we 
measure the severity of controlling shareholders’ tunneling activities as the total amount of 
“other receivables” scaled by total assets. 11 A higher value for tunneling indicates more 
severe agency problems and thus higher risk of default. Therefore, tunneling is expected to be 
positively associated with cost of bank loans. While we expect a negative association 
between board independence and cost of bank loans, the relation between board size and cost 
of bank loans is less clear-cut. On one hand, Yermack (1996) finds that board size is 
negatively associated with firm performance, which implies that board size is positively 
associated with cost of bank loans. On the other hand, Cheng (2008) finds that firms with 
                                                 
11The literature commonly uses the wedge between controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights 
as a proxy for tunneling. A few recent studies (e.g., Masulis et al. (2011)) note that not all wedges necessarily 
lead to tunneling. Therefore, we follow Jiang et al. (2010) and use a more direct measure of tunneling. “Other 
receivables” is an accounting item that includes receivables that are not part of ordinary business transactions. 
These receivables are essentially interest-free loans made by listed firms to other parties (Jiang et al. 2010).  
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larger boards have lower variability of firm performance. Also, firms with lower risk are 
expected to pay lower cost of bank loans, ceteris paribus. The relation between CEO political 
connection and cost of debt is not as straightforward as it may first appear. On one hand, 
Boubakri et al. (2010) find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity 
capital, as investors consider these firms less risky than non-connected firms. On the other 
hand, Chaney et al. (2011) find that the quality of accounting earnings in politically 
connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected firms, which 
implies a higher cost of bank loans for politically connected firms. Finally, following 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Zou and Adams (2008), we control for the influence of 
official lending rate on cost of bank loans. Specifically, following Zou and Adams (2008), the 
one- to three-year bank loan rate is used as a proxy for the official lending rate. We expect a 
positive relation between official lending rate and cost of bank loans. 
 We also include industry and year dummy variables in all regression analyses. 
Industry dummy variables are based on the classification system published by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which classifies all listed firms into 13 broad 
industries (12 industries if the financial service industry is excluded). Detailed descriptions of 
all variables used in this paper are reported in Table 1. 
< Insert Table 1 about here> 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 Tables 2A and 2B report the distribution of founding-family controlled firms and non-
founding-family controlled firms by year and industry, respectively. Table 2A shows the 
number and percentage of founding-family firms steadily rising, except for a small drop in 
the percentage between 2005 and 2006. In 2004, the Chinese government established the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SMEB) under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. A large 
proportion of all IPOs on the SMEB are by founding-family firms. Founding-family 
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controlled firms represent about 32.4% of all firms in our sample. The percentage of 
founding-family controlled firms rises to almost 42% as of the end of 2010, from about 
22.5% in 2004. This highlights the importance of studying the impacts of founding-family 
control. 
<Insert Tables 2A and 2B about here> 
 Table 2B shows the number and percentage of founding-family firms varying 
significantly across industries. The manufacturing industry has by far the largest number of 
founding-family firms, reflecting the fact that it also represents the largest industry by total 
number of firms. Also notable is that there is no founding-family firm in the power, gas, and 
water supply industry. This is not surprising, given that this is a highly regulated industry 
monopolized by newly privatized former state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, broken down by founding-family controlled 
firms and non-founding-family controlled firms. Both measures of the cost of bank loans, 
Rate 1 and Rate 2, are significantly lower in founding-family firms relative to non-founding-
family firms. The differences are significant at the 1% level. The cost of bank loans for both 
founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms are lower than the official lending rate, 
which ranges from 5.40% to 7.36% in our sample period. This suggests that the costs of some 
other financing sources (e.g., trade credits) are lower than bank loans. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 On average, founding-family firms are more likely to hire large auditors, have greater 
financial analyst coverage, and lower analyst forecast error than non-founding-family firms. 
However, trading volume is lower for founding-family firms. All differences are significant 
at the 1% level. Three of the four measures of information opacity indicate that founding-
family controlled firms are less opaque than non-founding-family controlled firms. As 
discussed in Section 4.2, the lower trading volume for founding-family firms is subject to 
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several interpretations. Thus, the overall data suggest that, on average, founding-family firms 
are less opaque than non-founding-family firms. 
 These statistics prompt a question: Is the lower cost of bank loans in founding-family 
firms simply a reflection of the fact that information is more transparent (transparency is 
expected to be negatively associated with cost of bank loans) in founding-family firms, 
relative to non-founding-family firms? We explore this issue later in Section 4. 
 Interestingly, the negative relation between founding-family control and cost of bank 
loans, and the positive relation between founding-family control and information 
transparency are consistent with the findings of Anderson et al. (2003) and Wang (2006), 
both of which use U.S. data. However, these results are contrary to the findings of Ellul et al. 
(2007) and of Fan and Wong (2002). Applying these latter studies’ arguments to China, a 
country with low investor protection and weak market and legal institutions, would predict a 
positive impact of founding-family control on cost of bank loans and a negative impact on 
information transparency. 
 Founding-family firms are, on average, significantly larger than non-founding-family 
firms. They have significantly lower leverage. Founding-family firms have significantly 
higher capital expenditure, but significantly lower PPE ratio. This might imply that these 
firms invest more in R&D and other long-term assets. The data are consistent with the 
findings of Fahlenbrach (2009), which uses U.S. data. 
 Founding-family firms have better cash flow performance as well as higher current 
ratio than non-founding-family firms, implying that these firms may be more concerned 
about their ability to service short-term debt. The data also show that founding-family firms 
have a lower sales growth rate, but the difference is insignificant. Higher capital expenditure, 




 Founding-family firms are significantly less likely to tunnel relative to non-founding-
family firms, which is consistent with Ma et al. (2012). This is in line with our earlier 
argument that founding families are more interested in the long-term success of their firms 
and they are willing to forgo some private benefits of control. Founding-family firms also 
have a higher percentage of independent directors than non-founding-family firms, which 
may imply that the former have better corporate governance. Also notable is that founding-
family firms are significantly more likely to be politically connected, which may support the 
argument that, to overcome imperfect markets and market-supporting institutions, private 
entrepreneurs have strong motivation to enter politics or to establish political connections (Li 
et al., 2006). 
 To summarize, founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms differ 
significantly in their cost of bank loans and information opacity. They also differ significantly 
in size, capital structure, investment, and corporate governance. We next formally assess how 
these factors affect the difference in cost of bank loans between these two groups of firms. 
 
4. Multivariate results 
4.1. Impact of founding-family control on cost of bank loans 
 Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions of cost of bank loans on founding-
family control and founding-family ownership. In columns (1) to (4), we use Rate 1 as the 
dependent variable and in columns (5) to (8) we use Rate 2 as the dependent variable. For 
each dependent variable, we run two sets of regressions, one using a dummy variable to 
indicate founding-family control and the other using continuous equity ownership by the 
founding-family. We use two specifications for each key independent variable. The first does 




<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of the Founding-family dummy are -0.284 and 
-0.269, respectively. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The results indicate that 
founding-family firms pay significantly lower cost of bank loans than non-founding-family 
firms, confirming the univariate differences reported in Table 3. The results in columns (3) 
and (4) provide further evidence on the negative impact of founding-family ownership on 
cost of bank loans. Compared with the Founding-family dummy, the coefficients of 
Founding-family ownership are statistically more significant (at the 1% level vs. the 5% level 
for Founding-family dummy). 
 The results in columns (5) to (8) are consistent with those in columns (1) to (4), in that 
both Founding-family dummy and Founding-family ownership are found to be significantly 
and negatively associated with cost of bank loans as measured by Rate 2. By comparing the 
results in columns (1) to (4) with those in (5) and (8), we observe an interesting fact. Both of 
the coefficients of Founding-family dummy (columns (5) and (6)) and Founding-family 
ownership (columns (7) and (8)) are significantly larger than those in columns (1) and (2) and 
in columns (3) and (4), respectively. Since Rate 2 takes into account capitalized interest and 
interest expense in the current year, the results may imply that the negative impact of 
founding family on the cost of bank loans is even stronger if longer-term cost is taken into 
account. 
 Thus, overall, the results in Table 4 confirm our first hypothesis that, on average, 
founding-family firms have significantly lower costs of bank loans, relative to non-founding-
family firms. The findings here and in Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that founding-family 
firms enjoy lower cost of debt both in China and the U.S., despite the immense difference in 
investor protection and other institutions. However, our finding is contrary to that of Ellul et 
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al. (2007), who find that family firms in countries with low investor protection suffer from 
higher cost of debt. Further investigation appears necessary to establish conclusive evidence. 
 The coefficients of control variables have the same sign across all eight specifications 
in Table 4, and are generally in line with our expectation. Larger (Firm size), better 
performing (Performance), less risky (Leverage and Current ratio), and higher-growth (Sales 
and CAPEX) firms pay lower cost of bank loans, relative to smaller, worse performing, more 
risky and lower-growth firms. Firms with more tunneling (Tunneling) pay higher cost of bank 
loans, as tunneling by controlling shareholders indicates a greater agency problem between 
controlling and minority shareholders and may increase default risk. Firms with larger boards 
(Board size) pay lower cost of bank loans, although the significance of the impact varies 
across specifications. This may provide some weak support to the notion that larger boards 
lower the variability of firm performance (Cheng, 2008). Percentage of independent directors 
(Independence) has no effect on cost of bank loans, implying that such directors do not play a 
monitoring role in China. Finally, political connection (Political) is positively associated with 
cost of bank loans, although not significantly. This result is contrary to Boubakri et al. 
(2010), who find a negative relation between political connection and cost of equity capital. 
In unreported results, we find that political connection does not have a significant effect on a 
firm’s financial leverage, a proxy for access to bank loans. These results may imply that for 
China’s privately controlled firms, political connection is established mainly for other 
purposes, for example, favored legal treatment (Cheung et al., 2010). 
4.2. Impact of founding-family control on information opacity 
 We next assess the impact of founding-family control on a firm’s information opacity. 
The results are reported in Table 5. Across all four regressions in Table 5, the key 
independent variable is a dummy variable denoted 1 for founding-family controlled firms. 
Column (1) uses the logistic regression model and columns (2) to (4) use OLS regressions. 
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<Insert Table 5 about here> 
  The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy variable denoted 1 if the firm hires 
a large auditor. The coefficient of Founding family dummy is 0.221 and is significant at the 
1% level, indicating that founding-family firms are significantly more likely to hire a large 
auditor, relative to non-founding-family firms. 
 The dependent variable in column (2) is analyst coverage, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm. The coefficient of Founding family 
dummy is 1.741, significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that founding-family firms 
attract significantly more financial analysts than non-founding-family firms. Our finding 
contradicts that of Lang et al. (2004), who find that analysts are less willing to follow family 
firms, because of concerns about a potential incentive to withhold or manipulate information. 
The contradictory findings between Lang et al. (2004) and the present paper provide indirect 
support to our argument that, in China, founding-family firms have fewer agency problems, 
relative to non–founding-family firms. 
 The dependent variable in column (3) is trading volume, measured as the ratio of 
average daily number of shares traded to total number of shares outstanding. The coefficient 
of Founding family dummy is -0.001, significant at the 5% level. The negative coefficient 
indicates that investors are less likely to buy or sell shares in founding-family firms than in 
non-founding-family firms. Apparently, this may imply that founding-family firms are more 
opaque when measured by trading volume. However, a plausible alternative interpretation is 
that, since shareholders in founding-family firms have greater confidence in the long-term 
success of their firms, they are more willing to hold their shares for a longer period of time, 
causing trading volume to be lower for founding-family firms. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to test which of these two interpretations applies here. 
28 
 
 The dependent variable in column (4) is forecast error. By definition, a smaller 
forecast error indicates that a firm’s information is more transparent. The coefficient of 
Founding-family dummy is -0.006, significant at the 10% level. This result shows that 
founding-family firms have smaller analysts’ forecast errors, indicating more transparent 
information. The number of observations in column (4) is significantly smaller than those in 
columns (1) to (3). This is because only 1853 of our sample firms have at least one analyst 
following. 
 Altogether, the results in Table 5 confirm the statistics in Table 3. The regression 
results for three out of four measures of information opacity provide strong evidence that 
founding-family firms are less opaque than non-founding-family firms. The result for the 
other measure, trading volume, is open to interpretation. Thus, the overall results in Table 5 
confirm H2. 
4.3. Impact of information opacity on the relation between founding-family control and cost 
of bank loans 
 Accounting and financial information is used to mitigate the agency problem between 
shareholders, managers, and creditors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bushman and Smith, 2001). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the agency problem is more severe when information 
is opaque. Applying this argument to the relation between founding-family control and the 
cost of bank loans implies that the negative relation documented in Section 4.1is weaker 
when information is opaque and is stronger when information is transparent. We test these 
notions in this section. The results are reported in Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
 In Panel A of Table 6, we first group all firms into founding-family firms and non-
founding-family firms. Within each group, firms are further divided into two sub-groups 
based on levels of information opacity. We then compare cost of bank loans for transparent 
founding-family firms with the cost for opaque founding-family firms, and compare cost of 
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bank loans for transparent non-founding-family firms with the cost for opaque non-founding-
family firms. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 The statistics show that among founding-family firms, cost of bank loans is 
significantly higher for opaque firms than for transparent firms. This difference is significant 
at the 1% level, for each of the four measures of opacity. For non-founding-family firms, 
although the cost of bank loans is also higher for opaque firms, the difference is less 
significant. In fact, there is no significant difference, whether a non-founding-family firm 
hires a large auditor or a small auditor, and whether a non-founding-family firm has high 
trading volume or low trading volume. The statistics in Panel A indicate that investors value 
information transparency more when a firm is a founding-family firm, probably because 
these firms are perceived to have a greater agency problem. 
 In Panel B of Table 6, we compare the cost of bank loans for transparent founding-
family firms with the cost for transparent non-founding-family firms, and compare the cost of 
bank loans for opaque founding-family firms with the cost for opaque non-founding-family 
firms. As we argue in Section 2, we expect the cost difference to be larger for transparent 
firms and smaller for non-transparent firms. 
 The statistics show that when information is transparent (i.e., Large auditor, Analyst > 
median, Volume > median, and Forecast error < median), founding-family firms pay 
significantly lower cost of bank loans than non-founding-family firms; the difference is 
significant at the 1% level (except for Rate 1 when Volume > median, which is at the 5% 
level). When information is opaque (i.e., Small auditor, Analyst < median, Volume < median, 
and Forecast error > median), although founding-family firms still pay lower cost of bank 
loans than non-founding-family firms, the difference is less significant. In some cases, the 
differences become insignificant. 
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 Based on the univariate statistics in Table 6, we then run OLS regressions to formally 
test the different impacts of founding-family control on cost of debt between transparent 
firms and opaque firms. The results are reported in Tables 7A and 7B. The dependent 
variable is Rate 1 in Table 7A and Rate 2 in Table 7B. All control variables are the same in 
both Tables 7A and 7B. 
<Insert Table 7A and Table 7B about here> 
 In Table 7A, column (1) contains only those firms that hire a large auditor (in other 
words, transparent firms only) and column (2) contains only those firms that hire a small 
auditor (in other words, opaque firms only). The coefficient of Founding family dummy in 
column (1) is -0.391 and is significant at the 5% level. Although the coefficient of Founding 
family dummy in column (2) is also negative (-0.181), it is not significant, even at the 10% 
level. That is, for firms hiring a large auditor (i.e., transparent firms), the difference in bank 
loan cost between founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms is more than double 
the difference for firms hiring a small auditor (i.e., opaque firms) (-0.391 vs. -0.181). The 
results in column (3) to column (9) demonstrate that the difference in the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient of Founding family dummy is also evident when the other three 
measures of information opacity are used. Results in Table 7B largely confirm those in 
Table 7A. Founding-family control significantly reduces cost of bank loans as measured by 
Rate 2 among transparent firms. However, founding-family control does not significantly 
affect cost of bank loans among opaque firms, except in column (2) when opacity is 
measured by small auditor, in which case founding-family firms pay marginally lower cost of 
bank loans than non-founding-family firms. 
 The statistics in Table 6 and the sub-group regression results in Table 7A and 
Table 7B provide strong evidence that founding-family control significantly reduces cost of 
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bank loans among transparent firms; but the negative impact of founding-family control on 
cost of bank loans weakens substantially when information is opaque. 
In Table 8, we provide further evidence on the role of information opacity in the 
relation between founding-family control and cost of bank loans. Our baseline models are 
shown in Table 4. We add to our baseline models a variable indicating information opacity 
and an interaction term between the founding-family control dummy and information opacity. 
The dependent variables are Rate 1 in columns (1) to (4) and Rate 2 in columns (5) to (8). 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 As is evident in Table 8, the coefficient of Founding family dummy is negative and 
significant across all eight models, indicating that founding-family firms pay significantly 
lower cost of bank loans when information is relatively transparent. The coefficients of all 
four measures of information opacity, namely Small auditor, NegAnalyst, NegVolume, and 
Forecast error, are positive and significant, indicating that, on average, opaque firms pay 
significantly higher cost of bank loans than transparent firms. These results are consistent 
with other studies (Sengupta, 1998; Francis et al., 2005; Livingston and Zhou, 2010). The 
coefficients of the interaction terms between Founding family dummy and information 
opacity are all positive and significant. The positive coefficients of the interaction terms 
indicate that the negative impact of founding-family control on the cost of bank loans is 
weaker when information is relatively more opaque. 
 The regression results in Table 8 confirm both the univariate statistics in Table 6 and 
the sub-group regression results in Tables 7A and 7B. Taken together, the statistics and 
regression results in Tables 6 to 8 provide strong evidence to support H3. 
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4.4. Role of institutions in relation between founding-family control, information opacity, and 
cost of bank loans 
 Building on findings in the literature that institutions can mitigate agency problems 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) and some recent 
empirical evidence that the relation between founding-family control and cost of debt differs 
among countries at different levels of institutional development (Ellul et al., 2007), we test 
the role of institutional development by taking advantage of its large variation among China’s 
regions. 
 The regressions in this section are based on Fan et al. (2011), who evaluate a wide 
range of economic and institutional factors in China and construct a range of indices to 
measure these factors at the provincial level. The indices are available up to 2009. Therefore, 
the sample period is 2004–2009 for all regressions in this section. We report the results in 
Tables 9 and 10. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 The dependent variable in Table 9 are cost of bank loans, measured by Rate 1 
(columns 1 to 4) and Rate 2 (columns 5 to 8). We use a variable for overall institutional 
development, Market, an index that measures the overall level of marketization of the 
province in which a firm is headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher index values indicate 
higher level of marketization. As is evident from Table 9, the coefficient of Market is 
negative and statistically significant in all eight regressions, indicating that firms in provinces 
with more developed institutions pay significantly lower cost of bank loans, after controlling 
for other factors. This result is consistent with prior studies that show that institutions can 
help mitigate agency problems. The coefficient of the interaction term between Founding 
family, Information opacity, and Market is negative and statistically significant, indicating 
33 
 
that the impact of information opacity is less significant in provinces with relatively more 
developed institutions. 
 In Table 10, we use another variable for institutional development, Legal, an index 
that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is 
headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher index values indicate a higher level of legal 
protection. As is evident from Table 10, the coefficient of Legal is negative and statistically 
significant (except in column (4)), indicating that firms located in provinces with better 
property rights protections pay lower cost of bank loans. The coefficient of the interaction 
term between Founding family, Information opacity, and Legal is negative in all eight 
models, but significant only in some models. The results in Table 10 indicate that while legal 
protection of property rights can mitigate the agency problem caused by information opacity, 
its impact is less significant than the impact of the overall degree of marketization. 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
 Overall, the results in Tables 9 and 10 support H4. That is, while information opacity, 
on average, weakens the negative relation between founding-family control and cost of bank 
loans, its impact is less significant in regions with more developed institutions. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 The preceding analyses provide evidence on the relation among founding-family 
control, information opacity, and cost of debt. There is a potential endogeneity concern, 
however. Specifically, lower cost of debt indicates better firm performance (both past and 
future), ceteris paribus. It is intuitive to argue that founding families are more likely to retain 
control when firms perform well. Further, greater information opacity can potentially deter 
outside investors and consequently make the firm more likely to be controlled by the 
founding family. In this section, we first address the potential endogeneity issue. We then test 
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the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions of founding-family firms and alternative 
measures of cost of bank loans. 
5.1. Endogeneity of founding-family control 
 We address the endogeneity issue with the instrumental variable (IV) approach. An 
appropriate IV needs to satisfy two conditions. First, the IV needs to be exogenous in the 
main regressions. Second, the IV must be correlated to the endogenous variable, conditional 
on other covariates. Anderson et al. (2003) conduct their robustness tests following 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), who use firm size and stock price volatility as IVs for insider 
ownership. However, numerous studies find that these two variables are correlated with firm 
valuations, which in turn affect cost of debt. Indeed, Anderson et al. (2003) find a strong link 
between cost of debt and firm size. 
 In this paper, we use two alternative IVs. Following Fahlenbrach (2009), our first IV 
(“Personal name”) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of 
IPO contains at least part of the personal name(s) of the founder(s). There is no reason to 
believe that the name of the firm at the time of IPO is related to current cost of bank loans. It 
is reasonable to assume that a firm that bears the name of the founders at IPO is more likely 
to be a founding-family controlled firm. Thus, our first IV satisfies both conditions for an 
appropriate IV. Following Adams et al. (2009), our second IV (“Multiple founders”) is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder (from different families). 
Whether a firm has more than one founder is unlikely to have direct effect on the firm’s cost 
of bank loans. Further, it is also reasonable to believe that a firm is more likely still to be 
controlled by one of the founding families if it was founded by more than one family. Thus, 
our second IV also meets both of the conditions. 
 We apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model in the robustness test. Following 
Kim and Lu (2011), we regress the founding-family control dummy and the interaction terms 
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between founding-family control and information opacity in the first-stage regression. The 
independent variables in the first stage include Personal name, the interaction term between 
Personal name and Information opacity, Multiple founders, and the interaction term between 
Multiple founders and Information opacity. All control variables used in the main regressions 
in Table 8 are also included in the first stage. For brevity, the results of the first-stage 
regressions are not reported in this paper, but they are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 In the second stage, the predicted values from the first stage are used as the key 
independent variables. Table 11 reports second-stage results with the cost of bank loans (Rate 
1 and Rate 2) as dependent variables. As is evident from Table 11, the coefficients of 
Founding family dummy are negative in all eight models. If we compare the results in Table 
11 with the corresponding results in Table 8, it is obvious that the coefficients are 
significantly larger than those in Table 8. For example, in column (1) of Table 11, the 
coefficient of Founding family dummy is -1.253, while the coefficient of Founding family in 
column (1) of Table 8 is -0.449. Similarly, the coefficient of Founding family*Small auditor 
in Table 11 is 0.549 compared with 0.247 in Table 8. The differences are also evident with 
the other three measures of information opacity. Thus, the results from the 2SLS regressions 
confirm our main results. 
<Insert Table 11 about here> 
5.2. Alternative specifications 
In our main analyses, we use two measures of interest rate as proxies for cost of bank 
loans. As a robustness check, we follow Luo et al. (2011) and use firm-level financial 
expenses (scaled by total assets), rather than interest rates, as a proxy for cost of bank loans. 
Since bank loans generally represent the largest component of a firm’s total liabilities, we 
expect similar results similar to those in our main analyses. We run all regressions from Table 
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4 to Table 11 using financial expenses as the dependent variable. The results generally 
confirm our expectations. 
In our main analyses, we define founding-family firms as those firms in which the 
founding-family is the ultimate largest shareholder, with at least 10% of cash flow rights. If 
we remove the 10% cash flow rights restriction, the number of founding-family firms in our 
sample increases to 1212. We run all regressions with this new definition and our main 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. Faccio and Lang (2002), along with several other 
studies, use 20% of voting rights as an alternative threshold in defining family firms. We also 
apply this definition to check the sensitivity of our results. There are 1021 founding-family 
firms in our sample under this definition. We repeat our analyses with this new set of 
founding-family firms. Again, our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Building on some recent studies in the U.S. (Anderson et al., 2003; Wang, 2006), we 
raise the question of whether the negative relation between founding-family control and cost 
of debt can be explained by the relatively more transparent information in founding-family 
firms, relative to non-founding-family firms. Using a sample of privately controlled public 
firms in China over the period 2004–2010, we find that, on average, founding-family 
controlled firms pay significantly lower cost of debt, relative to non-founding-family firms. 
We also find that this negative relation exists mainly in relatively transparent firms. 
Founding-family control does not significantly affect cost of debt when a firm is relatively 
opaque. We further provide evidence that institutional development reduces the impact of 
information opacity on the relation between founding-family control and cost of debt. This 
study highlights the importance of information opacity in understanding the impact of 
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Table 1. Descriptions of all variables used in the analyses. 
  
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
Rate 1 Interest expense / (short-term debt + long-term debt + debt due within one year) (Luo et al., 2011) 
Rate 2  (Interest expense + capitalized interest) / total liabilities (Zou and Adams, 2008) 
Key independent variables  
Founding family Dummy variable that equals 1 if both of the conditions are met: (1) the founder and founder family members hold at least 10% of the firm’s cash flow rights; and (2) the 
founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder. 
Founding-family ownership Fractional equity ownership by the founding family if a firm is classified as a founding-family firm; zero for all non-founding-family firms. 
Large auditor Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s annual financial report is audited by one of the largest 10 auditing firms in China (Big 4 international firms plus the largest 6 
national firms based on revenue); zero otherwise 
Small auditor Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s annual financial report is not audited by one of the largest ten auditing firms; zero otherwise 
Analyst Natural log of the number of financial analysts that follow a firm 
NegAnalyst Natural log of the number of financial analysts that follow a firm multiplied by negative 1 (i.e., NegAnalyst = Analyst*(-1)) 
Volume Average daily number of shares traded during the year / average number of total shares outstanding during the year  
NegVolume = Volume*(-1) 
Forecast error  Absolute value of the difference between the consensus of analysts’ forecast earnings per share and actual earnings per share scaled by firm stock price 
Borrowing firm characteristics  
Firm size Natural log of total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities / total assets 
PPE Net property, plant, and equipment / total assets 
Performance Net operating cash flow / total assets 
CAPEX Current assets / current liabilities 
Current ratio (Short-term bank borrowing + long-term bank borrowing) / total liabilities 
Sales (Total sales this year – total sales last year) / total sales last year  
Tunneling Amount of “other receivables” / total assets, a proxy for tunneling by controlling shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010) 
Board size  Natural log of total number of directors on the board 
Board independence (Independence) Number of independent directors / total number of directors 
Political connection (Political) Dummy variable that equals 1 if either the Chairman or the CEO is politically connected; zero otherwise 
ROA Net income / total assets 
Largest Equity ownership of the largest shareholder 
Official rate Financial institutions’ official lending rate specified by the People’s Bank of China (the central bank in China). We use the one-to three-year loan rate as a proxy for the 
official lending rate (Zou and Adams, 2008)  
Instrumental variables  
Personal name Dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains (part of) personal name(s) related to the founder(s) (Fahlenbrach, 2009) 
Multiple founders Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder (Adams et al., 2009) 
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A firm is defined as a founding-family firm if both conditions are met: (1) Founder and founder family members hold at least 10% of firm cash flow rights; and (2) the founding-family (all 
family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.  
 
 







Year All firms Founding-family firms Non-founding-family firms Percentage of founding-family 
firms (%) 
2004 334 75 259 22.5 
2005 394 103 291 26.1 
2006 424 105 319 24.8 
2007 467 130 337 27.8 
2008 534 187 347 35.0 
2009 592 228 364 38.5 
2010 635 266 369 41.9 







Founding-family firms Non-founding-family 
firms 
Percentage of founding-
family firms (%) 
A Agricultural, forestry, livestock & fishery 90 38 52 42.2 
B Mining 24 6 18 25.0 
C Manufacturing 1995 736 1259 36.9 
D Power, gas & water production & supply 34 0 34 0 
E Construction 64 28 36 43.8 
F Transport & storage 33 9 24 27.3 
G Information technology 284 135 149 47.5 
H Wholesale & retail trade 212 21 191 9.9 
J Real estate 323 69 254 21.4 
K Social services 97 15 82 15.5 
L Communication & cultural industry 13 6 7 46.2 
M Comprehensive 211 31 180 14.7 
 Total  3380 1094 2286 32.4 
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Table 3. Univariate analyses on mean differences between founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms. 
Variables include cost of bank loans (Rate 1 and Rate 2), corporate information opacity (auditor identity, analyst coverage, trading volume, and analysts’ forecast error) and borrowing firm 
characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 1. P-values using the two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test) are reported in parentheses below the differences in means. 
 * Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
 ** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
 *** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
  
  All firms  Founding-family firms  
Non-founding- 
family firms  
Difference in 
means  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
(2)–(3) p-value 
Variables No. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables          
Rate 1 3380 2.522 20.924 1.646 4.169 2.942 25.270 -1.296 0.009*** 
Rate 2 3380 3.082 21.110 1.916 4.585 3.641 25.455 -1.725 0.001*** 
Key independent variables          
Founding-family 
ownership 3380 0.103 0.171 0.318 0.147 0 0 0.318 0.000*** 
Large auditor 3380 0.200 0.400 0.243 0.429 0.179 0.383 0.064 0.000*** 
No. of analysts 3380 3.475 5.684 5.959 6.891 2.287 4.549 3.672 0.000*** 
Volume 3335 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.012 -0.001 0.000*** 
Forecast error 1853 0.029 0.049 0.026 0.036 0.034 0.060 -0.008 0.005*** 
Other control variables          
Total assets (RMB billions) 3380 2.309 3.429 2.740 3.939 2.103 3.135 0.637 0.000*** 
Leverage 3380 0.844 4.294 0.452 0.200 1.032 0.109 -0.580 0.000*** 
PPE 3380 0.254 0.172 0.241 0.150 0.260 0.181 -0.019 0.001*** 
Performance 3380 -0.095 6.009 0.066 0.064 -0.172 7.306 0.238 0.060* 
CAPEX 3380 0.055 0.066 0.071 0.062 0.047 0.066 0.023 0.000*** 
Current ratio 3380 1.783 2.861 2.102 2.691 1.630 2.927 0.471 0.000*** 
Sales 3380 0.279 0.938 0.277 0.626 0.281 1.055 -0.004 0.444 
Tunneling 3380 0.064 0.137 0.026 0.058 0.082 0.157 -0.056 0.000*** 
No. of directors 3380 8.724 1.759 8.668 1.606 8.750 1.828 -0.082 0.092* 
Board independence 3380 0.363 0.534 0.367 0.051 0.361 0.055 0.005 0.003*** 
Political connection 3380 0.365 0.482 0.473 0.499 0.314 0.464 0.158 0.000*** 
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Table 4. OLS regression analyses on impact of founding-family control on cost of bank loans. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of founding-family control on the cost of debt. Columns (1) to (4) use Rate 1 as the dependent variable and columns (5) to (8) use 
Rate 2 as the dependent variable. For each dependent variable, we use both Founding family dummy and Founding-family ownership as the key independent variables. Rate 1, Rate 2, 
Founding-family dummy, Founding-family ownership and all other control variables are defined in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White 
(1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
Dependent variable Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 
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Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 
R-square 0.978 0.979 0.978 0.979 0.964 0.966 0.964 0.966 
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Table 5. Regression analyses on impacts of founding-family control on corporate information opacity. 
This table presents regression results of the impacts of founding-family control on corporate information opacity. Column 
(1) uses the logistic regression model. Columns (2) to (4) use OLS regression models. The dependent variables are the four 
measures of corporate opacity used in this study, namely, the identity (size) of auditing firms, the number of analysts 
following a firm, the trading volume of a firm’s stock, and the level of analysts’ forecast error of a firm’s earnings. The key 
independent variable is the Founding family dummy. The definitions of all variables are given in Table 1. P-values based on 
standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 




Dependent variable Large auditor Analyst Volume Forecast error 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 



























































































Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  3380 3380 3335 1853 
R-square  0.421 0.487 0.307 
Wald chi square 225.14    
Log likelihood  -2116.03    
Pseudo R-square 0.055    
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Table 6. Univariate analyses on impacts of corporate information opacity on cost of bank loans between founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms. 
Panel A 
Panel B 
This table presents univariate analysis results of different impacts of corporate information opacity on cost of bank loans between founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms. Four 
different measures of information opacity are used, namely, identity (size) of auditing firms, number of analysts following a firm, trading volume of a firm’s stock, and analysts’ forecast error 
of a firm’s earnings. The definitions of these four measures are given in Table 1. P-values using two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test) are reported in parentheses below the 
differences in means. Panel A compares differences in cost of bank loans for founding-family firms with different levels of corporate information opacity and for non-founding-family firms 
with different levels of corporate information opacity. The full sample is first divided into two groups, i.e., founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms. Then, within each group, firms 
are further divided into two sub-groups based on the level of information opacity. Panel B compares differences in cost of bank loans between founding-family firms and non-founding-family 
firms, for a given level of information opacity. For each measure of corporate information opacity, the full sample is first divided into two groups based on the level of information opacity. 
Then, within each group, firms are further divided into founding-family firms and non-founding-family firms. 
* Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
Auditor identity Analyst coverage Trading volume Forecast error 




















  (1) (2) (1)–(2) (3) (4) (3)–(4) (5) (6) (5)–(6) (7) (8) (7)–(8) 
All firms 
Rate 1 3.374 2.310 1.064 (0.275) 3.197 1.598 
1.599*** 
(0.005) 2.691 2.351 
0.341 
(0.319) 1.832 0.883 
0.950*** 
(0.000) 
Rate 2 3.797 2.904 0.893 (0.309) 4.085 1.708 
2.377*** 
(0.000) 3.125 2.893 
0.232 





Rate 1 1.845 1.024 0.821*** (0.001) 2.357 1.276 
1.081*** 
(0.000) 2.130 1.207 
0.923*** 
(0.000) 1.690 0.087 
1.603*** 
(0.000) 
Rate 2 2.147 1.195 0.952*** (0.000) 3.048 1.327 
1.721*** 
(0.000) 2.579 1.314 
1.265*** 





Rate 1 4.902 2.515 2.387 (0.208) 3.396 1.926 
1.470** 
(0.028) 3.461 2.579 
1.002 
(0.179) 1.996 1.682 
0.313 
(0.111) 
Rate 2 5.489 3.238 2.251 (0.222) 4.331 2.096 
2.235*** 
(0.002) 3.715 3.573 
0.142 
(0.381) 2.354 1.829 
0.525** 
(0.032) 
   
Auditor identity Analyst coverage Trading volume Forecast error 
















Rate 1 (1) Founding-family firms 1.845 1.024 2.357 1.276 2.130 1.207 1.690 0.087 (2) Non-founding-family firms 4.902 2.515 3.396 1.926 3.461 2.579 1.996 1.682 

















Rate 2 (3) Founding-family firms 2.147 1.195 3.048 1.327 2.579 1.314 1.658 0.217 (4) Non-founding-family firms 5.489 3.238 4.331 2.096 3.715 3.573 2.354 1.829 
  Diff. in means 



















Table 7A. OLS regression analyses on relation between founding-family control and cost of bank loans for transparent firms and opaque firms. 
This table presents OLS regression results of different impacts of founding-family control on cost of bank loans for firms with different levels of information opacity. The dependent variable is 
Rate 1, calculated as interest expense divided by the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and debt due in one year (Luo et al., 2011). Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) are for high transparent 
firms; Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) are for low transparent (or opaque) firms. Founding family firm dummy and all other control variables are defined in Table 1. P-values based on standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. 
* Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 Dependent variable: Rate 1 
 Auditor identity Analyst coverage Trading volume Forecast error 
 Large auditor Small auditor Analyst > median Analyst < median Volume > median Volume < median Error < median Error > median 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 675 2705 1426 1954 1682 1653 928 927 
R-square 0.997 0.364 0.987 0.444 0.992 0.339 0.541 0.252 
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Table 7B. OLS regression analyses on relation between founding-family control and cost of bank loans for transparent firms and opaque firms. 
This table presents OLS regression results of impacts of founding-family control on cost of bank loans for firms with different levels of information opacity. The dependent variable is Rate 2, 
calculated as the sum of interest expense and capitalized interest divided by total liabilities (Zou and Adams, 2008). Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) are for high transparent firms; Columns (2), 
(4), (6) and (8) are for low transparent (or opaque) firms. Founding family firm dummy and all other control variables are defined in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 Dependent variable: Rate 2 
 Auditor identity Analyst coverage Trading volume Forecast error 
 Large auditor Small auditor Analyst > median Analyst < median Volume > median Volume < median Error < median Error > median 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 675 2705 1426 1954 1682 1653 928 927 
R-square 0.994 0.321 0.973 0.517 0.989 0.287 0.525 0.420 
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Table 8. OLS regression analyses on impacts of corporate information opacity on the relation between founding-family 
control and cost of bank loans. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of borrowing firms’ information opacity on the relation between 
founding-family control and cost of bank loans. Columns (1) to (4) use Rate 1 as the dependent variable and columns (5) to 
(8) use Rate 2 as the dependent variable. For each dependent variable, we run four regressions to test impacts of four 
measures of information opacity and the interactive impacts between founding-family control and information opacity on 
cost of bank loans. The definitions of Rate 1, Rate 2, Founding family dummy, information opacity, and all other control 
variables are given in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are 
reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
  
Dependent variable Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






























Small auditor 0.334** (0.042) 
   0.451** 
(0.045) 
   
Founding family * 
 Small auditor  
0.247** 
(0.046) 
   0.480** 
(0.026) 
   
NegAnalyst  0.024** (0.040) 
   0.102*** 
(0.000) 
  




   0.069** 
(0.037) 
  
NegVolume   29.678*** (0.000) 
   31.359*** 
(0.001) 
 
Founding family * 
NegVolume 
  18.898** 
(0.022) 
   18.877** 
(0.040) 
 
Forecast error    1.112* (0.054) 
   0.489** 
(0.036) 
Founding family * 
Forecast error 
   6.981* 
(0.059) 
   4.981** 
(0.050) 




















































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  3380 3380 3335 1853 3380 3380 3335 1853 
R-square 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.416 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.476 
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Table 9. Market development and impact of corporate information opacity on the relation between founding-family 
control and cost of bank loans. 
This table presents OLS regression results of the effect of market development on the impact of corporate information 
opacity on the relation between founding-family control and cost of bank loans. The sample period in this table is 2004–
2009, the period for which the market development index is available. Market is an index that measures the overall level of 
marketization in the province in which a firm is headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher index values indicate higher level 
of marketization. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) to (4) use Rate 1 as the dependent variable and 
columns (5) to (8) use Rate 2 as the dependent variable. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
using White (1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level.  
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
Dependent variable Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 













































Small auditor 0.365** (0.014) 
   0.420* 
(0.064) 
   
Founding family * Small auditor 0.610* (0.089) 
   1.960* 
(0.053) 
   




   -0.190* 
(0.053) 
   
NegAnalyst  0.028* (0.060) 
   0.095*** 
(0.000) 
  
Founding family * NegAnalyst  0.039* (0.061) 
   0.390** 
(0.019) 
  




   -0.038** 
(0.020) 
  
NegVolume   28.770*** (0.000) 
   31.896*** 
(0.000) 
 
Founding family * NegVolume   60.900** (0.014) 
   34.376* 
(0.059) 
 
Founding family * NegVolume 
* Market 
  -60.614** 
(0.033) 
   -54.699* 
(0.055) 
 
Forecast error    1.784* (0.071) 
   2.177** 
(0.037) 
Founding family * Forecast error    11.894* (0.056) 
   8.894** 
(0.033) 
Founding family * Forecast error * Market    -0.684* (0.061) 
   -0.452* 
(0.084) 




















































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 2745 2745 2713 1373 2745 2745 2713 1373 
R-square 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.533 0.976 0.977 0.978 0.546 
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Table 10. Property rights and impact of corporate information opacity on the relation between founding-family control and 
cost of bank loans. 
Dependent variable Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 













































Small auditor 0.386*** (0.008) 
   0.427* 
(0.059) 
   
Founding family * Small auditor 0.220* (0.085) 
   0.578* 
(0.091) 
   




   -0.020** 
(0.041) 
   
NegAnalyst  0.029* (0.054) 
   0.097*** 
(0.000) 
  
Founding family * NegAnalyst  0.028* (0.058) 
   0.111** 
(0.045) 
  




   -0.004* 
(0.056) 
  
NegVolume   26.951*** (0.001) 
   30.337*** 
(0.004) 
 
Founding family * NegVolume   16.383 (0.109) 
   34.232* 
(0.092) 
 
Founding family * NegVolume 
* Legal 
  -0.482* 
(0.092) 
   -0.934** 
(0.050) 
 
Forecast error    1.697* (0.096) 
   2.097** 
(0.036) 
Founding family * Forecast error    8.850* (0.087) 
   7.610** 
(0.021) 
Founding family * Forecast error 
* Legal 
   -0.553* 
(0.075) 
   -0.131 
(0.111) 




















































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 2745 2745 2713 1373 2745 2745 2713 1373 
R-square 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.533 0.976 0.976 0.978 0.547 
This table presents OLS regression results of the effect of legal protection of property rights on the impact of corporate 
information opacity on the relation between founding-family control and cost of bank loans. The sample period in this 
table is 2004–2009, the period for which the property rights protection index is available. Legal is an index that measures 
the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher 
index values indicate higher level of legal protection. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) to (4) use 
Rate 1 as the dependent variable and columns (5) to (8) use Rate 2 as the dependent variable. P-values based on standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level.  
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 11. Instrumental variable regression analyses on interactive impacts of founding-family control and corporate 
information opacity on cost of bank loans 
This table presents the second-stage results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) regressions of 
the impacts of borrowing firms’ information opacity on the relation between founding-family control and cost of bank 
loans. In this table, Founding-family dummy is instrumented with two instrumental variables (IV). The first IV is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains a personal name related to the founder(s) 
(“Personal name”). The second IV is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder (“Multiple 
founders”). Columns (1) to (4) use Rate 1 as the dependent variable and columns (5) to (8) use Rate 2 as the dependent 
variable. The definitions of Rate 1, Rate 2, corporate information opacity, and all other control variables are given in Table 
1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* Indicate significance at the 10% level.  
** Indicate significance at the 5% level. 





Dependent variable Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 Rate 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

































Small auditor 0.475** (0.039) 
   0.517** 
(0.027) 
   




   0.697** 
(0.018) 
   
NegAnalyst  0.034** (0.026) 
   0.114*** 
(0.000) 
  




   0.120*** 
(0.005) 
  
NegVolume   26.503*** (0.001) 
   37.801*** 
(0.000) 
 
Founding family * 
NegVolume 
  49.110*** 
(0.001) 
   47.284*** 
(0.006) 
 
Forecast error    1.478** (0.047) 
   0.743* 
(0.064) 
Founding family * 
Forecast error 
   11.868** 
(0.023) 
   5.889*** 
(0.007) 




















































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  3380 3380 3335 1853 3380 3380 3335 1853 
R-square 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.352 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.377 
